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EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AT GROUND LEVEL:
THE CONSEQUENCES OF NONSTATE ACTION
KENNETH L. KARST†
INTRODUCTION
More than four decades ago Bill Van Alstyne and I, juniors on
the Ohio State law faculty, co-authored an article.1 We argued that
the judge-made “state action” doctrine, understood as a formal
barrier to claims under the Fourteenth Amendment, was impeding
serious judicial consideration of things that mattered.2 Four years
later, after migrating to Duke, Bill added a trenchant critique
elaborating on the theme and deepening the analysis.3 For a time,
academic commentary looked forward to a lowering of the state
action barrier,4 but the Supreme Court soon put an end to such

Copyright © 2005 by Kenneth L. Karst.
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Scott Cummings has been more than helpful in acquainting me with the literature of community
economic development and in commenting on a draft of this Essay. My debt to him will be
obvious in the concluding pages of the text. My thanks to Jennifer Lentz and Kevin Gerson, two
of our school’s marvelous Research Librarians, for their typical (i.e., extraordinary) help. Given
this Essay’s concerns about equal employment opportunity, I should note that for several
months these two took turns; each provided research assistance to me and my colleagues while
the other stayed home with Alexander, born in 2003. Perhaps this will be Alexander’s first
footnote, but it seems unlikely to be his last.
1. William W. Van Alstyne & Kenneth L. Karst, State Action, 14 STAN . L. R EV. 3 (1961).
2. Id. at 3–6. As we then recognized, the pathbreaking article was Harold W. Horowitz,
The Misleading Search for “State Action” Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 S. CAL. L. R EV.
208 (1957). All writers along these lines owe a debt of gratitude to Robert Hale’s essay, Force
and the State: A Comparison of “Political” and “Economic” Compulsion, 35 COLUM. L. R EV.
149 (1935). Among a wealth of modern discussions of the state action doctrine, two standouts
are LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V. TUSHNET, R EMNANTS OF BELIEF: CONTEMPORARY
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 49–71 (1996) (chapter on “The State Action Paradox”), and Gillian
E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. R EV. 1367, 1410–37, 1456–1502 (2003).
3. William W. Van Alstyne, Mr. Justice Black, Constitutional Review, and the Talisman of
State Action, 1965 DUKE L.J. 219, 219–24.
4. E.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1966 Term—Foreword: “State Action,”
Equal Protection, and California’s Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. R EV. 69, 108 (1967) (noting that
the then-existing “‘state action’ criterion shows few signs of life”); Kenneth L. Karst & Harold
W. Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey: A Telophase of Substantive Equal Protection, 1967 SUP. CT.
R EV. 39, 65–66 (“It is sufficient to say that there is general agreement on at least one point: that
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speculations. In this Essay I do not rake the ashes of this debate—at
least not explicitly. Rather, I seek to highlight the importance of
nongovernmental discrimination in the lives of the individuals whose
experiences add up to group subordination, and to add some
reminders that the line between “state action” and “private action”
has become conspicuously artificial in today’s America.
Factitious or not, the state action barrier remains high, leaving
untouched even those forms of “private” behavior that devalue the
constitutional principle of equal citizenship. I begin with some
evidence that federal and state civil rights laws can help to fill the gap,
particularly in assuring access to public accommodations and equal
access to work. As we shall see, however, in some areas of
discrimination—notably, housing discrimination—the responsive
capacity of regulatory law is severely limited. What remains is a hope:
Perhaps the interactions of governmental with nongovernmental
actors—some of the very links that minimize the appeal of the state
action doctrine —can contribute to the vindication of equa l
citizenship. If the public goal of an inclusive society needs help from
private sources, it is encouraging to know that some actors in the
private sector are recognizing their own stake in the same goal. The
Essay concludes with some ruminations on ways in which these
sentiments have been translated into action. This project is my tribute
to an old friend, centered on a region of civil rights concerns where, I
hope, he and I can find a measure of agreement.
I. REAL PEOPLE’S LIVES: PRIVATE
CONDUCT AND ACCESS TO EQUAL CITIZENSHIP
I begin by looking at two arenas of public life where
discrimination by nongovernmental actors can undermine people’s
experience of inclusion in the community: public accommodations
and other places of trade, and the workplace. In both of these arenas,
civil rights laws have had considerable success in reducing private
discrimination.

the decisions of the Supreme Court in the post-war era have steadily —and properly —extended
the reach of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to control more and more the conduct
of private individuals.”).
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A. Access to Public Accommodations and Other Places of Trade
The Reconstruction Congress understood the important role
played by private dealings in the subordination of individuals and of a
racial group. The Civil Rights Act of 1866, even construed narrowly
as a set of limits on official state discrimination, recognized that the
newly freed African Americans, if they were to be equal citizens,
needed to be treated as equals in the law of contract and property.5 In
1875, Congress went on to prohibit racial discrimination by the
owners and managers of hotels, theaters, railroads, and the like.6 This
was the last of the Reconstruction civil rights statutes, for
Reconstruction itself was abandoned in the Compromise of 1877.7
The Supreme Court gave its own validation to this compromise in the
Civil Rights Cases,8 which held that the 1875 Act was beyond the
constitutional powers of Congress.9 One centerpiece of the Court’s
opinion was its invention of the state action limitation.10 On this
theory, the Fourteenth Amendment reached only official state action,
and so Congress had no power to enforce the amendment’s equal
protection clause against racial discrimination by the private owners
and managers of public accommodations.11
Although I shall not inflate the existing oversupply of analyses of
this decision, I note my agreement with the first Justice John Marshall
Harlan, writing in lone dissent.12 He called the persistence of these
forms of nongovernmental discrimination a badge of slavery in
violation of the Thirteenth Amendment,13 and a denial of equal

5. 14 Stat. 27 (1866). In 1968, the Supreme Court interpreted the Act more generously, as
a direct prohibition on private discrimination in sales of property. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
392 U.S. 409, 421 (1968).
6. 18 Stat. 335 (1875).
7. The bargain settled the electoral dispute over the 1876 presidential election. It gave the
Republican candidate, Rutherford B. Hayes, the presidency, in exchange for a promise to end
the military occupation of the South, and more generally to turn the subject of race relations
over to the “redeemer” Southern legislators—that is, to the white South. See C. VANN
WOODWARD, R EUNION AND R EACTION: THE COMPROMISE OF 1877 AND THE END OF
R ECONSTRUCTION 7–8 (1966) (providing a summary of the traditionally recognized terms of the
“Bargain of 1877”).
8. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
9. Id. at 25.
10. See id. at 11 (holding that “[i]t is state action of a particular character that is
prohibited” by the Fourteenth Amendment).
11. Id. at 19.
12. Id. at 26–62 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
13. Id. at 43.
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citizenship in violation of the Fourteenth.14 For our present purposes,
what matters is Justice Harlan’s recognition that equal access to
public accommodations was a telling indicator of civil freedom and
equal citizenship.15 When he said that hotels and theaters and
railroads performed “public functions,”16 he was referring not simply
to the licensing of those businesses by the state, but also to their longunderstood places in the public life of the community. Their functions
as public institutions had been recognized in the ancient common law
that required innkeepers and common carriers to be open to all
citizens.17 To be turned away from a hotel on account of one’s race
was a social symbol of major importance, a badge of racial inferiority
worn in public.18
The system of Jim Crow, given early encouragement by the
Supreme Court,19 was not just a legal structure. It was a total social
system, in which public and private behaviors were interlaced to
maintain the subordination of a race. Privately-owned public
accommodations made their own contributions, systematically
denying access to African Americans or segregating the races, in
either case symbolizing the all-pervading racial hierarchy.20 When
W.E.B. DuBois protested against these indignities and their parallels
in the North, he did not distinguish between official and private forms
of racial discrimination.21 And when the modern civil rights
movement began, it was no accident that the earliest forms of direct
action were the sit-ins and the freedom rides.22 The black college
students who sat at privately-owned lunch counters, awaiting service
until the police led them away, and the black and white riders who sat
together in privately-owned buses, were symbolically claiming their
places as equal citizens, entitled to respect in their communities’
public life. To be told that you are not wanted at the lunch counter, or

14. Id. at 54.
15. See id. at 62 (“To-day it is the colored race which is denied, by corporations and
individuals wielding public authority, rights fundamental in their freedom and citizenship.”).
16. Id. at 36.
17. Id. at 40–41.
18. Id. at 42–43.
19. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 543 (1896).
20. The classic treatment is still JOHN DOLLARD, CASTE AND CLASS IN A SOUTHERN
TOWN (1937).
21. W.E.B. DUBOIS, THE CRISIS WRITINGS passim (Daniel Walden ed., 1972).
22. For the account of one young woman of these intense —and tense —times, see generally
ANNE MOODY, COMING OF AGE IN MISSISSIPPI (1968).
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that you have to sit in the back of the bus, is to be told—in the most
public way imaginable—that you are not good enough to sit with
those who are the real citizens. The degradation, the hurt, attaches
first to the individual, but it is instantly recognized by all persons of
all races as reflecting —and reinforcing—a group status harm.
No wonder, then, that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 devoted one
title to the prohibition of racial discrimination in hotels, restaurants,
gas stations, and places of entertainment.23 Compliance with this part
of the Act, on the whole, has been a success story. In the South,
before 1964, a restaurant owner or hotel manager might be afraid to
serve nonwhites, for fear of a loss of white trade or even violent
retaliation. After the Supreme Court upheld the Act, some restaurant
owners and virtually all large hotels quickly opened their doors to all
comers. It is fair to say that today, in the field of traditional public
accommodations, a culture of compliance has taken hold. The case of
a major operator’s racial discrimination makes headlines.24
Retail stores are not covered by the 1964 act, but most states
have adopted civil rights acts of their own, and some such laws
(California ’s, for example) apply generally to all business
establishments.25 Yet, African Americans’ accounts of suspicion,
denial of entry, and worse are so plentiful that Regina Austin could
say—supporting her assertion with persuasive evidence—“[t]here can
hardly be a black person in urban America who has not been denied
entry to a store, closely watched, snubbed, questioned about her or
his ability to pay for an item, or stopped and detained for
shoplifting.”26 These chronicles are matched by persistent stories that
African American males, even dressed in Wall Street attire, have
trouble getting a taxi after the sun goes down. And Patricia Williams’s
now-famous account of being locked out of a Benetton store in New
23. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title II, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 243–246 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2000)).
24. A celebrated series of lawsuits against Denny’s restaurants was settled by a payment of
damages totaling $46 million and forms of corporate apology that included a $1.45 million grant
to nine civil rights organizations, announced in the presence of the heads of many of those
organizations. See, e.g., Kia Morgan Allen, Denny’s Restaurants Give Black Groups $1.5 Million,
ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONST ., Jan. 16, 1997, at E1; Denny’s Begins Check Reimbursement to
Settle Discrimination Claims, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN , Dec. 12, 1995, at C3. See
generally JIM ADAMSON, THE DENNY’S STORY: HOW A COMPANY IN CRISIS R ESURRECTED ITS
GOOD N AME AND R EPUTATION (2000).
25. Unruh Civil Rights Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51–53 (West 2000).
26. Regina Austin, “A Nation of Thieves”: Securing Black People’s Right to Shop and to
Sell in White America, 1994 UTAH L. R EV. 147, 148.
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York,27 apparently doubted by some white readers,28 finds ready
acceptance among black readers.29 It may be hard to do scientific
studies of such incidents,30 but at a minimum the frequency of reports
shows the distance we have yet to travel in eradicating racialized
fears. I say “fears” because there is a substantial likelihood that the
same employee who bars the door against an African American also
believes—sincerely —in racial nondiscrimination as an abstract norm.
We are dealing here with the unconscious racism that has been
illuminated by Charles Lawrence, Linda Hamilton Krieger, and
others.31
It bears repeating that many such incidents are violations of state
civil rights laws. Yet the indignities mostly go unchallenged in court,
unless they appear to be condoned by the management of a large
company.32 Surely this type of civil rights statute deserves enactment
in every state. Indeed, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 deserves to be
broadened to apply to these institutions as well as the traditional
public accommodations—concededly a political result that is most
unlikely today.33 Even if enforcement litigation were rare, a statutory
ban against (for example) race-based denials of service would help to
call the subject to the attention of retail corporations’ top managers.
Publicity, too, is an informal enforcement mechanism, as Benetton’s

27. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF R ACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAW
PROFESSOR 44–51 (1991).
28. E.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 371–73 (1995) (“[I]s she [Williams]
embroidering the facts for dramatic effect . . . ? Also, how does she know that the sales clerk
refused to let her in the store because she’s black?”).
29. I base the latter statement, not on survey research, but on conversations with African
American colleagues.
30. See Peter Siegelman, Racial Discrimination in “Everyday” Commercial Transa ctions:
What Do We Know, What Do We Need to Know, and How Can We Find Out? , in A NATIONAL
R EPORT CARD ON DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICA: THE R OLE OF TESTING 69 (Michael Fix &
Margery Austin Turner eds., 1999). On a related theme, see Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender
and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. R EV. 817, 819 (1991) and Ian
Ayres & Peter Siegelman, Race and Gender Discrimination in Bargaining for a New Car, 85 AM.
ECON. R EV. 304, 304–05 (1995).
31. See infra notes 47–50 and accompanying text.
32. Even in such a case, a boycott is as likely as a lawsuit. For a discussion on boycotts, see
Austin, supra note 26, at 155.
33. For a masterful treatment of the historical development of this body of law, see
generally Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private
Property, 90 N W. U. L. R EV. 1283 (1996). Singer reported tha t only seven states, all former
members of the Confederacy, entirely lacked such laws at the time he wrote. Id. at 1437. He
would read the 1964 Act to cover retailers, and alternatively calls for an amendment to achieve
that purpose, an event with a “likelihood . . . close to zero.” Id. at 1423.
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management must know. How many glossy “united colors” ads in the
New Yorker were neutralized when Patricia Williams blew the
whistle?
For those of us who are keeping score, in traditional public
accommodations (the descendants of innkeepers and common
carriers34 ) the law has scored a marked success against private
discrimination in its most egregious form, race-based exclusion.
Beyond those establishments—even though state law generally
forbids private discrimination—the record is at best mixed. We have
no reliable way of knowing what in terrorem effects the state civil
rights laws may have had. We do know that in today’s world, law or
no law, some employees will be frightened by a dark face at the door.
In my view, however, despite the inability of these laws to protect
against all forms of private discrimination in retail stores, they are still
valuable—serving as deterrents in some cases, and more generally
reaffirming the morality of inclusion.
B. Access to Work and Its Rewards
To call discrimination by nongovernmental employers “private
discrimination” can be misleading. The world of work, wherever the
work may be located, is an important part of the public life of the
community. Work provides more than a paycheck; it is the source of a
great many values that are less tangible, but no less important in a
human society. Work is a vital arena for demonstrating one’s
individual identity, in dimensions so numerous that, for many
purposes, “you become your job.”35 One becomes known for his or
her work habits, which may demonstrate dependability, industry,
initiative, congeniality—all significant indicators, not just of the work
done, but of the person. To the contrary, the absence of work is
commonly taken to indicate irresponsibility or sloth. Beyond these
general indices of identity, particular forms of work are commonly
associated with degrees of power, of talent, of creativity, of learning.
Our assumptions about those popular perceptions work their way

34. Although the 1964 Act does not speak to common carriers, those subject to federal
regulation have been forbidden to discriminate on grounds of race since the Supreme Court’s
decision in Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80, 94 (1941), interpreting the Interstate
Commerce Act. Today this prohibition is embodied in 49 U.S.C. § 10741 (2000).
35. STUDS TERKEL, WORKING 102 (1975). In this passage I draw on earlier writing. See
Kenneth L. Karst, The Coming Crisis of Work in Constitutional Perspective, 82 CORNELL L.
R EV. 523, 533 (1997) (“Work shapes individual identities in ways both general and particular.”).
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into our own assessment of the work we do—and thus a more general
sense of our individual worth. For the individual, work may imply
independence, achievement, advancement up the socio-economic
ladder, security, or esteem. Correspondingly, the absence of work
may imply dependence on others, failure, stagnation or decline,
insecurity, or shame. These self-evaluations, I repeat, are largely
based on the individual’s well-founded assumptions about other
people’s perceptions. In this sense, the workplace is a stage, and the
personal is public. In sum, access to decent work is a badge of full
citizenship.36
Consider the woman who seeks to enter one of the building
trades. Even today, although she may be allowed to join the union,
she may well find some resistance among her fellow employees, and
even sexual harassment in the form of denigration on the job,
assignment to unpleasant tasks, or refusal to afford experience that
might lead to promotion.37 Yet, after she has been on the job for some
time, she may find that her day-to-day performance has won
acceptance among her co-workers. The notion that “women can’t be
plumbers”38 will recede as more and more women personify its
negation, simply by showing up for work and doing the job well.
The workplace is not just a stage, but also a classroom—and a
co-educational classroom, at that. The public import of workplace
integration, also including racial integration, is plain enough. Given
the continued racial segregation of our urban housing,39 work has
become the basic venue in which large numbers of Americans can
come to know each other across such boundaries as race and sex, to
see each other not as abstract labels but as whole people. The
implications for group status hierarchies are huge. The African
American policeman on the streets of Birmingham and the woman
electrician on a construction site carry messages for all who see them,
36. JUDITH SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 63–101 (1991);
see William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. R EV. 1, 4 (1999)
(noting that access to decent work is part of the “social citizenship tradition”).
37. These forms of conduct are common when women enter jobs historically limited to
men, and they ought to be re cognized as sexual harassment; yet, they can be ignored, given the
prominence of sexuality in that term’s usual applications. See Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing
Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1755–73 (1998) (arguing that a main motivation behind
sexual harassment is to “denigrat[e] women’s competence for the purpose of keeping them
away from male -dominated jobs”).
38. Sylvia A. Law, “Girls Can’t Be Plumbers”—Affirmative Action for Women in
Construction: Beyond Goals and Quotas, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. R EV. 45, 45 (1989).
39. See infra Part II.A.
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and each message proclaims not just an individual’s status but also a
group’s entitlement to inclusion in the ranks of equal citizens.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids employers, both
governmental and nongovernmental, to discriminate on grounds of
race or sex in hiring, promotion, and other employment practices.
Although some local government bodies (notably police and fire
departments) continue to face lawsuits for employment
discrimination,40 and some have recently remained under judicial
supervision because of past discriminatory practices,41 it is fair to say
that private employer practices are Title VII’s most important targets
today. The very expression “Title VII” is widely known, among
employers and employees alike. The statute’s antidiscrimination
norm is now taken for granted, not just as a legal requirement, but as
a moral guideline; the law’s educational effects have gone well
beyond the local teachings of its particular applications.
The text of Title VII clearly forbids an employer to adopt a
practice that, on its face, discriminates against a worker because she is
a woman, or because he is a member of a racial or ethnic minority.
Three decades ago, the Supreme Court interpreted Title VII to cover
another sort of discrimination. If an employer were engaging in a
practice that was, on its face, race-neutral (or sex-neutral, etc.), but
which had the effect of excluding disparate numbers of women or
minority applicants for hiring (or promotion, etc.), then the practice
would be considered a prima facie violation of Title VII, rebuttable
only if employer could justify it as a job-related qualification.42 The
mechanism of this rule for “disparate impact” cases will be familiar to
all lawyers: protect the interest in equal opportunity by shifting the
burden of proof to one who would deny it. Although the Supreme
Court later backed away from this doctrine, Congress soon restored
it.43
40. See, e.g., Colin Moynihan, Latino Police Officers and City Settle Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
1, 2004, at 33 (noting cases involving the New York City police department).
41. For accounts of efforts to end the effects of consent decrees and the like, see Matt
O’Connor, Town OKs More U.S. Hiring Oversight; Cicero Didn’t Give Enough Racial Data ,
CHI . TRIB., May 23, 2003, at 2 (Cicero, Illinois police and fire departments); Mike Donila,
Consultant Expected to Upda te City on Promotion System, MACON TELEGRAPH, Aug. 11, 2003
(Macon, Georgia police and fire departments); David Harper, Audit Sees Compliance With
Decree, TULSA WORLD, Dec. 17, 2003, at A15 (Tulsa, Oklahoma police).
42. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
43. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 658 (1980), “overruled” by statute in
the aptly -named Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 122-166, 105 Stat. 1071
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (1994)).
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So far, so good—although disparate impact cases are relatively
few in number.44 In the overwhe lmingly more likely Title VII case of
“disparate treatment” of an individual employee, the courts continue
to require a showing of purposeful discrimination based on the
employee’s race (or sex, etc.) before relief can be granted.45 The
result is to assimilate this type of employment discrimination case into
the legal standard used in determining constitutional challenges to
governmental action, including employment practices, under the
equal protection clause. In such a case, the government’s action is not
characterized as racial discrimination, and thus not subjected to
exacting judicial scrutiny of its justifications, unless the challenging
party shows that the action’s racially disparate effect was intended by
the relevant government officials.46 Title VII’s parallel
“discriminatory purpose” requirement, also a judicial invention,
ignores a central feature of the psychology of discrimination.
Discriminatory action is often the product of an actor who is
unconscious of any racist purpose—and who would resent the
suggestion that he or she wanted to inflict harm because of an
employee’s race (or sex, etc.). Dealing with the “purpose”
requirement in equal protection doctrine, Charles Lawrence
persuasively made this point in general terms some years ago. 47 More
recently, Linda Hamilton Krieger has shown beyond peradventure
how the analogous Title VII requirement, which ultimately puts the
burden on the employee-plaintiff to prove that the asserted nonracial
(etc.) reasons for action by an employer or supervisor are

44. One widely cited study notes that research on disparate impact cases “is extremely
costly because disparate impact cases are quite rare.” Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, The QWord as Red Herring: Why Disparate Impact Liability Does Not Induce Hiring Quotas, 74 TEX.
L. R EV. 1487, 1494 n.27 (1996).
45. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 516 (1993) (“[The plaintiff has] the
ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of intentional
discrimination.” (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256
(1981))).
46. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). The Supreme Court applied this
principle to equal protection challenges founded on sex discrimination in Personnel
Administator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). For an illuminating analysis
of the purposes behind this stiffening of the constitutional test, see Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of
Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN . L. R EV. 1105, 1110–19 (1989).
47. Charles R. Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning With
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. R EV. 317, 322 (1987) (“[A] large part of the behavior that
produces racial discrimination is influenced by unconscious racial motivation.”).
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“pretextual,”48 fails to take account of the cognitive processes
underlying disparate treatment in the typical employment
discrimination case.49
As Professor Krieger notes, it is not easy to devise doctrinal
remedies for this state of affairs. She suggests a reformulation of
disparate treatment doctrine in which proof by an employee-plaintiff
that his or her group status (race, sex, etc.) “played a role [conscious
or unconscious] in causing the employer’s action or decision” would
establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment. Absent a showing
of purposeful discrimination, however, she would limit remedies to
“individualized injunctive and other equitable relief, including back
pay and front pay and attorneys’ fees.” Proof of conscious
discrimination would continue to be necessary for an award of
damages.50 I agree with Professor Krieger that her proposals could be
adopted by the courts without amendment of the statute, but surely
such a set of rulings is improbable in today’s environment—and if by
some miracle they were to be given, they would soon be overturned
by a congressional amendment to Title VII.
II. CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE INTERTWINING OF
GOVERNMENT WITH PRIVATE BEHAVIOR
It is a cliché of our time that the membrane dividing “public” and
“private” spheres of modern society is permeable. What official
actors do has huge effects on private choices—sometimes leaving no
real choice at all. Private actors, in turn, not only have powerful
effects on the making of public policy but directly “govern” the
conduct of ordinary citizens in my riad ways. Legal scholarship over
the last generation has repeatedly sounded this theme.51 In the
discussion that follows, I first consider housing discrimination as a

48. On the methods of proving that the employer’s explanation is a pretext, see LEX K.
LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 8.04 (2d ed. 1994).
49. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity , 47 STAN. L. R EV. 1161, 1186 (1995)
[hereinafter Krieger, Cognitive Bias]; see also Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika:
Intergroup Relations After Affirmative Action, 86 CAL. L. R EV. 1251, 1276–91 (1998).
50. Krieger, Cognitive Bias, supra note 49, at 1241–44.
51. Two symposia are especially noteworthy: Symposium, The Public/Private Distinction,
130 U. PA. L. R EV. 1289 (1982); Symposium, Public Values in an Era of Privatization, 116
HARV. L. R EV. 1211 (2003). My favorites in this distinguished body of literature are Jody
Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. R EV. 543 (2000), and David A.
Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. R EV. 1165 (1999).
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case study in the interaction of public and private actor s, and—alas—
an example of the failure of civil rights law. Then, after a cursory
catalogue of types of interconnection between governmental and
private behaviors, I identify some rays of hope that the private sector
itself will offer leadership toward a more inclusive society.
A. The Neighborhood: The State, “Market Forces,” and Racial
Isolation
Official racial zoning has been unconstitutional since 1917,52 but
long afterward government was still deeply involved in the
segregation of urban neighborhoods. Thr ee well-known examples will
suffice. (i) For years official government guidelines for lenders
explicitly called for “redlining” of minority neighborhoods, and the
racial matching of applicants for housing loans with neighborhoods
defined by their races. (ii) State-licensed brokers systematically
steered seekers of housing into segregated neighborhoods. (iii) Local
governments’ urban renewal and public housing programs
accelerated the concentration of poor minority residents.53
Aggravated by such public supports, neighborhood segregation was
thoroughly entrenched by the time civil rights law came to address
the field of housing. And here the scorecard for antidiscrimination
legislation must record a failure so dismal as to dishearten the most
optimistic observer.
Three decades and more have passed since 1968, when Congress
and the Supreme Court made clear that a broad range of acts of
private housing discrimination violated federal law.54 After twenty
years, and again after thirty years, academic symposia, while doing
their best to nurture hope, mostly bemoaned the continued existence
of housing segregation at or near historically high levels.55 The easy

52.
53.

Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917).
On all three forms of public support for segregation, see DOUGLAS S. MASSEY &
N ANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE
UNDERCLASS 50–57 (1993).
54. The Fair Housing Act of 1968 is codified in 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. The Supreme Court
made its own contribution in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., interpreting the 1866 Civil Rights
Act to fill some gaps left by the act recently adopted by Congress. 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968).
55. See, e.g., THE FAIR HOUSING ACT AFTER TWENTY Y EARS: A CONFERENCE AT THE
Y ALE LAW SCHOOL 32 (Robert G. Schwenn ed., 1989) (“I also try to be realistic, however. And
that realism tells me that it is unlikely that the nation is going to return to what some, not I, call
the ‘free spending days’ of the Great Society.”); Symposium, Promises Kept, Promises Broken,
52 U. MIAMI L. R EV. 925 (1998).
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case for a legal remedy is the case of a real estate developer who
openly refuses to sell houses to black buyers.56 But in the post-1968
world, those easy cases are extremely rare. In the aftermath of that
year’s changes in the law, no one will admit to racial discrimination—
partly for fear of inviting a lawsuit, and partly because the ethos of
public life today makes it hard to admit such a purpose, even to
oneself.
A decade ago, Professors Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton
comprehensively detailed the severe constraints on federal
administrative enforcement of the Fair Housing Act; the
disinclination of the Justice Department to bring a criminal
prosecution absent a “pattern or practice” of discrimination or an
issue “of general public importance”; and the difficulty of bringing
private suits for damages by individuals who could prove
discrimination against them. In a chapter entitled “The Failure of
Public Policy,” Massey and Denton conclude,
The fundamental weakness of the 1968 Fair Housing Act was its
reliance on individual efforts to combat a social problem that was
systemic and institutional in nature. . . . [Despite sympathetic
interpretations by federal courts of plaintiffs’ rights to sue,]
[i]ndividual and institutional discriminators could persist in their
behavior, knowing that the federal government was powerless to do
anything about it, and that in the remote possibility of a conviction,
the financial penalties they faced were modest. 57

The authors went on to say that the 1988 amendments to the Fair
Housing Act had “remedied the principal flaws of the 1968 act.”58 Yet
by 2001, Denton, although she noted a modest decline of
“hypersegregation” in growing multi-ethnic metropolitan areas, also
noted that older metropolitan areas with large African American
populations had seen no such change. Current demographic
estimates, she said, suggested that these patterns would continue.59
Even after the 1988 amendments, hardly anyone is to be found who
believes that the law’s weapons against nondiscrimination will make
much of a dent in residential segregation.

56. This was the factual setting for Jones, 392 U.S. at 509.
57. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 53, at 198, 200.
58. Id. at 210.
59. Nancy A. Denton, The Role of Residential Segregation in Promoting and Maintaining
Inequality in Wealth and Property , 34 IND. L. R EV. 1199, 1202–05 (2001).
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We might analogize the case of the large apartment owner or the
housing developer to the case of the hotel that used to admit only
whites, but responded to the 1964 Act by opening the door to all
patrons. These are large-scale operators, who are susceptible to
multiple legal actions and broad-ranging remedies60 and who (in 2005)
do not want to be known as racists, even unconscious racists. But the
discriminatory seller of an individual home, like the white
homeowner who moves away in response to an influx of minority
neighbors, looks more like the local employee of a retail store who
bars the door to a single would-be patron. Each of these actors is
likely to have a story to tell (often believed in the telling) that denies
racial discrimination. For the typical would-be minority lessee or
buyer subjected to one-on-one discrimination—say, one who is told
by a state-licensed real estate agent about a house in an integrated
neighborhood, but not about houses in virtually all-white
neighborhoods—the discrimination may be of such low visibility that
no one but the agent is aware of it.61 Yet, suppose the would-be lessee
or buyer does find out. Assume, as well, that he or she is aware that
the discrimination is unlawful.62 Filing a legal action—always risky to
the spirit as well as the pocketbook—often will not seem worth its
psychic and other costs.63 And what cause of action does a successful
minority buyer have when, two months later, a white neighbor moves

60. Margalynne Armstrong, Desegregation Through Private Litigation: Using Equitable
Remedies to Achieve the Purposes of the Fair Housing Act, 64 TEMP. L. R EV. 909, 931–32 (1991).
As Professor Armstrong notes, individual actions against other defendants have failed to
achieve much integration. Id. at 915–26.
61. On the incidence of such unlawful steering as measured by black and white “testers,”
see Margery Austin Turner, Limits on Neighborhood Choice: Evidence of Racial and Ethnic
Steering in Urban Housing Ma rkets, in CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE: MEASUREMENT
OF DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICA 117, 125–36 (Michael Fix & Raymond J. Struyk eds., 1993).
62. In the case posed, chances are good that the would-be lessee or buyer will know that
this sort of racial or ethnic steering is unlawful. Beyond the screamingly clear case, however,
public awareness declines. See Martin D. Abravanel, Public Knowledge of Fair Housing Law:
Does It Protect Against Housing Discrimination? , 13 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 469, 480 (2002)
(“With the exception of one category of discrimination, a majority of the public correctly
identified as unlawful the behavior of landlords, home sellers, real estate agents, and mortgage
lenders when it is described to them . . . . However, across the scenarios that depict
discriminatory conduct, there is considerable variation as to the size of that majority, which
ranges from substantial to modest.”).
63. An individual complaint against an agent may, however, persuade a local fair housing
group to seek injunctive relief broadly applying to the agent’s future treatment of other minority
applicants. Armstrong, supra note 60, at 933–34. This injunctive approach, for all its promise,
seems not to have made a major impact on segregation as of 2001, the year of Denton’s article.
See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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away? The latter form of housing discrimination lies beyond the reach
of any legal remedy.64 Even for clear-cut violations of housing
discrimination law, governmental enforcement is pathetically weak.65
Unsurprisingly, “[h]ousing discrimination persists nationwide and is
severely underreported. ”66
The governmental authorities in suburbs that serve as
destinations for “white flight” can play a role in intensifying the racial
isolation of the cities from which white families have fled. One means
of preserving a suburb’s racial mix (that is, the absence of mix) is to
resist the development of low-income housing affordable by minority
families. A famous example was the town of Penfield, New York, a
white suburb of Rochester.67 Penfield had a zoning ordinance that
effectively excluded such a development. When some low-income
members of racial and ethnic minorities sued, urging that the
discriminatory effects of the ordinance were just what the town
officials intended, the Supreme Court held that they lacked the sort of
injury that would give them standing to sue. Justice Lewis F. Powell
wrote for the majority. True, two builders had applied for rezoning, to
allow them to build low- and moderate-income housing. But, said
Justice Powell,
the record is devoid of any indication that these projects, or other
like projects, would have satisfied petitioners’ needs at prices they
could afford. . . . Indeed, petitioners’ descriptions of their individual
financial situations and housing needs suggest precisely the
contrary—that their inability to reside in Penfield is the

64. On the role of agents, emphasizing their opportunities and incentives for
discrimination, see JOHN Y INGER, CLOSED DOORS, OPPORTUNITIES LOST: THE CONTINUING
COSTS OF HOUSING DISCRIMINATION 161–82 (1995).
65. For the multiple reasons why, see Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private Enforcement of
Civil Rights: The Case of Housing and Employment, 45 UCLA L. R EV. 1401, 1438–51 (1998). In
1998, the U.S. government filed a grand total of 56 complaints against acts of housing
discrimination. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL R IGHTS
COMPLAINTS IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS, 1990–98, at 4 (2000).
66. N ATIONAL FAIR HOUSING ALLIANCE, 2002 FAIR HOUSING TRENDS R EPORT 1 (2002),
at http://www.nationalfairhousing.org/html/trends/report.pdf. See also National Fair Housing
Alliance, Less Than One Percent of Illegal Housing Discrimination Reported, According to New
Report by National Fair Housing Alliance, US N EWSWIRE, April 16, 2003, at
http://release s.usnewswire.com/getrelease.asp?id=15011 (“Thirty five years after the passage of
the Fair Housing Act, discrimination persists virtually unchallenged.”).
67. I have taken the substance of this paragraph on Warth from an earlier discussion.
Kenneth L. Karst, Citizenship, Race, and Marginality , 30 WM. & MARY L. R EV. 1, 19–20 (1988).
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consequence of the economics of the area housing market, rather
than of respondents’ assertedly illegal acts.68

The “economics” of housing in Penfield is here treated as a fact of
nature, on the order of the town’s distance from Lake Ontario. But
the government of Penfield itself had helped to shape the local
housing supply, precisely by adopting and maintaining the
exclusionary zoning law before the Court. One might have described
the minority plaintiffs’ alleged injury as the denial of a chance to
enter a housing market that had not been so structured by official
action. But these plaintiffs, said the Court, had no standing to sue.
The result, of course, is the further concentration of minority poor in
Rochester. Too bad about those market forces.
The case of Penfield is merely one illustration of a larger point:
lawmakers, including judges, are strongly disinclined to find any
public responsibility for the private “choices” that aggravate racial
isolation. The most serious harms of the detachment of minority poor
from the larger community are the harms of neighborhood poverty.
These harms are both intense and widespread, with each severe
problem engendering other severe problems in a process that is not so
much circular as spherical. Poor, racially isolated neighborhoods are
mostly served by poor schools, where children have little motivation
to study because their everyday surroundings emphasize the absence
of jobs and the charms of quick money from the drug trade. The
criminal justice system comes to bear on young minority males with a
vengeance, ruining their futures in the employment market and the
marriage market. And the young women? Well, the moralists heap
obloquy on them for having children outside marriage. This is not the
place to take on the whole grim subject of concentrated poverty in
minority communities, but the reader will get the point.69
“Housing discrimination,” in this context, is a watered-down
name for one element in a vicious cycle.70 If you want to live in a nice
68.
69.

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 506 (1975).
A good beginning in the literature is WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK
DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE N EW URBAN POOR 25–86 (1996). I skimmed the surface of
the subject, citing a number of relevant works, in Kenneth L. Karst, Poverty and Rights: A PreMillennial Triptych, 16 N OTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 399, 407–20 (2002). On urban
poverty as socialization, see Kenneth L. Karst, Law, Cultural Conflict, and the Socialization of
Children, 91 CAL. L. R EV. 967, 1011–20 (2003).
70. For analysis of studies of the interactions highlighted here, see Y INGER, supra note 64,
at 135–58 (chapter entitled “The Impact of Housing Discrimination on Education, Employment,
and Poverty”).
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neighborhood, you need a good job. To get a good job, you need a
good education. To get your children into a good school, the one clear
avenue is to live in a nice neighborhood. An effort to use law to
attack any given point in the cycle is turned away with a statement
that someone else is responsible. It isn’t the owner’s fault that you
can’t afford to buy her house. It isn’t the employer’s fault that your
education is deficient. It isn’t the school system’s fault that the school
is located in an area where crime looks like a more certain path to
wealth than preparing for a nonexistent job . . . . And, of course, the
state is not responsible for “private” discriminations made by “the
market”—even though public institutions, including the law, have
provided essential platforms for those decisions.71 In short, the myriad
official and nongovernmental decisions that add up to racial isolation
in poor neighborhoods have myriad effects—grave, life-destroying
effects that are obscured by an insipid label like “housing
discrimination.” These harms come down on people one by one, but
they also contribute to the status degradation of groups.
With neighborhood integration in mind, commentators have
suggested alternative strategies of quite a different kind: to educate
the public in ways designed to destabilize racial categories,72 to
engage more generally in a fight against institutional racism,73 or at
least to expose institutional racism for all to see.74 These suggestions
have in common the assumption that, in the field of housing, law
reform is unlikely to work until much deeper reforms of mind and
spirit are achieved. The authors’ despair seems justified, but in this
chilly season for civil rights, the deeper reforms seem even more
distant.

71. For an illuminating critique, going far beyond the scope of the discussion in the text
above, see Kenneth M. Casebeer, The Empty State and Nobody’s Market: The Political
Economy of Non-Responsibility and the Judicial Disappearing of the Civil Rights Movement, 54
U. MIAMI L. R EV. 247, 278–84 (2000) (criticizing Warth v. Seldin as part of a more generalized
contraction of justiciability).
72. Alex M. Johnson, Jr., How Race and Poverty Intersect to Prevent Integration:
Destabilizing Race as a Vehicle to Integrate Neighborhoods, 143 U. PA . L. R EV. 1595, 1635
(1995).
73. John O. Calmore, Race/ism Lost and Found: The Fair Housing Act at Thirty, 52 U.
MIAMI . L. R EV. 1067, 1128–29 (1998).
74. See, e.g., Martha R. Mahoney, Segregation, Whiteness, and Transformation, 143 U. PA.
L. R EV. 1659, 1678–80 (1995) (calling for reports on the likely impact on racial segregation of
proposed land-use decisions, such as highway building, or resource allocations, by analogy to
environmental impact statements).
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Another proposed remedy is to seek a distinct sort of “spatial
equality” by using public resources to enhance existing minority
neighborhoods.75 This proposal has two clear virtues. It is not
vulnerable to the “white flight” that so commonly has followed
substantial minority entry into formerly all-white neighborhoods, and
it does not make the paternalist assumption that what the members of
racial and ethnic minorities need, to make their lives worthwhile, is
closer proximity to whites. It also has the political advantage—I will
not call this a “virtue ”—of not threatening the lily-whiteness of the
suburbs. However, given the desperation for funds among local and
state governments, it may be some time before we can expect public
agencies to take on the burden of such efforts. Cooperative
public/private initiatives may be another matter, as I show in this
Essay’s concluding discussion.
B. Public-Private Interconnections: A Short String of Assertive
Platitudes
What follows in this Section is nothing new. A reader with any
experience with the “public-private” literature in law or political
science is advised to skip to Section II.C. Here I merely state, without
supporting argument but with a few references, a series of
illustrations of the cliché I outlined before:76 Today the public and
private sectors of American life are elaborately interconnected, each
affecting the other in so many ways that the very conception of a
distinction between public and private spheres, while useful and even
necessary for some purposes,77 has a great capacity to mislead if taken
too literally.
In the years since the Great Depression and World War II, the
size and functions of government in America have grown rapidly to
their present vast extensions. Responding to a correspondingly rapid
expansion in citizens’ expectations, government has taken on major

75. John O. Calmore, Spatial Equality and the Kerner Commission Report: A Back-to-theFuture Essay, 71 N.C. L. R EV. 1487, 1495 (1993).
76. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
77. See SEIDMAN & TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 51 (“Without a private sphere in which
individual decisions are not attributable to the government, the very concept of an individual
right loses its meaning.”); Kenneth L. Karst, State Action—Beyond Race, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF THE AMERICAN CONST. 2491, 2492 (Leonard W. Levy, Kenneth L. Karst, & Adam Winkler
eds., 2d ed. 2000) (“It is hard to see how American constitutionalism could get along without
some form of the publicprivate [sic] distinction, absent a fundamental transformation of the idea
of constitutionalism.”).
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responsibilities for maintaining economic prosperity, and for
promoting the public’s health, welfare, and education. Privately
owned and operated institutions play central roles in defining tasks
for government and in carrying out public functions. Much of the
work of modern government consists in collecting money from
nongovernmental sources via taxes and other means, and in
distributing money to individuals and private institutions.
Government distributions can take the form of direct or indirect
subsidies, employment of labor, purchases of goods, or “contracting
out” of services. Government regulations (or the abandonment of
existing regulations) can have huge consequences for private
interests, because virtually every regulation of private conduct has
some wealth-distributive effect. For all these reasons, private interests
spend enormous amounts of money on lobbying and other political
expenditures, to promote the election and further support of officials
who are in a position to train the government’s distributive hose in
their direction.78 Of course, whatever action an official may take in
response to these efforts, he or she will describe the action in the
language of “the public interest.”
A handful of quotations, spanning half a century of scholarship,
will round out this illustrative effort:
1952: “The modern state, having ultimate responsibility for the
national economy, necessarily sought the production of conditions
by industry which would satisfy the political demands. A variety of
tools lie to the hand of the political state. It can impose
requirements. . . . It can supply capital. It can, if need be, own
businesses, and as an ultimate resource can take over almost any
given corporation (of significant scope) in any industry. . . . The
solutions [of crises resulting from applications of these tools] have
taken form i n law.” 79

78. In 1994 Kevin Phillips pointed out that some 90,000 persons in Washington were
engaged in or supporting lobby ing, producing a “feeding frenzy” seeking federal funds,
favorable congressional legislation, or both. K EVIN PHILLIPS, ARROGANT CAPITAL:
WASHINGTON, WALL STREET, AND THE FRUSTRATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 89 (1994). On
“the privatization of American public life,” see also MICHAEL SCHUDSON, THE GOOD CITIZEN:
A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CIVIC LIFE 240–42, 278–81 (1998).
79. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Constitutional Limitations on Corporate Activity —Protection of
Personal Rights from Invasion Through Economic Power, 100 U. PA . L. R EV. 933, 933–34, 943
(1952) (including antitrust law as one of several means by which legal doctrine
“constitutionalizes” concentrated corporate power).

012306 06_KARST.DOC

1610

2/6/2006 10:20 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 54:1591

1975: “A large number of institutions has been created in the U.S.
almost wholly dependent on the public treasury for continued
support, and other more traditional institutions in society have
become partly dependent on public support.” 80
2000: “A variety of nongovernmental actors, including corporations,
public interest organizations, private standard setting bodies,
professional associations, and nonprofit groups, engage in ‘public’
decision making in myriad ways. Nongovernmental actors perform
‘legislative’ and ‘adjudicative’ roles, along with many others, in a
broad variety of regulatory contexts. They set standards, provide
services, and deliver benefits. In addition, they help implement,
monitor,
and
enforce
compliance
with
regulations.
Nongovernmental organizations exert, in the context of a larger
network of relationships, coercive power. A careful inquiry into the
private role in governance reveals not only its pervasiveness, but
also the extent to which it operates symbiotically with public
authority.” 81
2002: “[Government activity] now embraces a dizzying array of
loans, loan guarantees, grants, contracts, social regulation, economic
regulation, insurance, tax expenditures, vouchers, and more. . . . [A]
major share—in many cases the major share—of the discretion over
the operation of public programs routinely comes to rest not with
the responsible governmental agencies, but with the third-party
actors that actually carry the programs out.” 82

80. Bruce L. P. Smith, The Public Use of the Private Sector, in THE N EW POLITICAL
ECONOMY: THE PUBLIC USE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR 1, 21 (Bruce L. P. Smith ed., 1975). For
a 1975 account of military procurement that sounds eerily like a present-day description, see
Martin Edmonds, Accountability and the Military -Industrial Complex, in THE N EW POLITICAL
ECONOMY: THE PUBLIC USE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR, supra , at 148.
The temptations of conflicts of interest in the field of military procurement have been
widely known for decades. What is new is public recognition of similar temptations in the field
of research by the National Institutes of Health. For some horrifying examples, thoroughly
documented, see David Willman, Stealth Merger: Drug Companies and Government Medical
Research (pts. 1–6), L.A. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2003, at A1, A32–35. This multifaceted story deserves a
place in textbooks on public choice theory.
81. Freeman, supra note 51, at 547.
82. Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An
Introduction, in THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE N EW GOVERNANCE 1, 2
(Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002).
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2003: “Congress now routinely authorizes and federal agencies now
administer most of domestic policy through state and local agencies,
for-profit firms, and nonprofit organizations.” 83

Enough said.
C. The Stake of Nongovernmental Actors in an Inclusive Society
In a “globalized” era when American manufacturers by the
hundreds are exporting jobs to Mexico and Malaysia and beyond, at
first blush it may seem silly to suggest that important players in the
private sector may be willing to take action in the interest of a more
inclusive society. But the field of civil rights has produced some
private choices along just those lines. Two such instances, separated
by a quarter century, involved different kinds of affirmative action,
differently motivated.
Three decades ago, the craft workers in Kaiser Aluminum’s
workforce were almost all white—no surprise, given that craft hiring
was limited to persons with previous craft experience, and the craft
unions had long excluded black workers. This pattern of racial
segregation might well have established a prima facie “disparate
impact” case against Kaiser (or the steelworkers’ union, or both) in
an action under Title VII by black candidates for craft jobs. It also
jeopardized Kaiser’s federal government contracts.84 In the shadow of
the law, in 1974 Kaiser and the United Steelworkers entered into a
labor contract providing for a new craft training program, including
an affirmative action plan designed to eliminate conspicuous racial
imbalances in craft employment. The plan called for selection for the
training program to be based generally on worker seniority but
reserved 50 percent of the openings for black workers. Predictably,
some black workers were selected over some white workers with
greater seniority, and one of the latter brought suit, claiming a
violation of Title VII. In United Steelworkers of America v. Weber85
the Supreme Court (7–2) rejected this claim and upheld the
affirmative action program.86 Both the la nguage of Title VII and the
law’s legislative history gave credence to Justice Rehnquist’s
83. John J. DiIulio, Jr., Government by Proxy: A Faithful Overview, 116 HARV. L. R EV.
1271, 1271 (2003).
84. The Office of Federal Contract Compliance had criticized Kaiser. United Steelworkers
of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 210 (1979).
85. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
86. Id. at 197.
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argument in dissent that the majority had misapplied the statute, but
the Court, while recognizing the force of those arguments, insisted
that Title VII’s fundamental purpose was “to break down old patterns
of racial segregation and hierarchy” and to “open employment
opportunities for Negroes in occupations which have been
traditionally closed to them”87 —the very purposes of the plan before
the Court.
If one were looking for an example of the intertwining of public
and private power in shaping a piece of the social order, it would be
hard to find a better one than this affirmative action plan. Kaiser and
the Steelworkers were (and remain) two important loci of private
economic power. They had taken their step toward a racially inclusive
force of craft workers at a time when similarly directed government
action—either by a court, enforcing Title VII, or by the executive
branch, enforcing the policy of nondiscrimination by government
contractors—was a real possibility. Even so, the Court made clear
that the validity of a “voluntary” affirmative action program by a
private employer did not depend on whether the program was
motivated by fear of this sort of liability.88 Today the Court’s decision
remains very much alive as a Title VII precedent.
In June 2003 the Supreme Court decided another affirmative
action case in which important private actors played a vital role. In
the University of Michigan law school case, Grutter v. Bollinger,89 a
great many big centers of private power—collectively seen as a proxy
for the American Establishment—weighed in as amici curiae in
support of the school’s diversity admissions program.90 The import of
one such brief, by the Association of American Law Schools, might
be discounted on the ground that most of the universities in the
association had a direct financial interest; they might lose federal
subsidies if their law schools’ affirmative action programs violated the
law. But several other briefs, filed by major private players, had a
tenor and a persuasive power that were altogether different. The brief
that drew the most attention was filed by a number of former military

87. See id. at 208 (in the latter passage quoting Senator Hubert Humphrey, a leading
sponsor, during the Senate’s debate preceding Title VII’s adoption).
88. Id. at 208 n.8.
89. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
90. Scores of briefs amici curiae were filed on both sides of this case and its companion,
Gratz v. Bollinger, which invalidated the same university’s undergraduate admissions program
on the ground that it too closely rese mbled a racial quota, 539 U.S. 244, 250 (2003).
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and naval officers of the highest rank, along with a number of
decorated war heroes with later experience in high governmental
office, former supervisors of the service academies, and former high
defense officials of all administrations going back through that of
President Reagan.91 The brief caught the Justices’ attention for the
same reason it was reported in the newspapers: most of these amici
were famous people. Their brief reminded the Supreme Court of the
racial tensions, including violence, in the armed services during the
Vietnam years, and noted what the services had learned from that
painful experience: an integrated corps of enlisted personnel needs an
integrated leadership. The service academies had affirmative action
programs that they wanted to preserve, and the amici pointed out that
college ROTC programs also needed to draw from integrated pools
of students.92 The brief called the services’ situation “a microcosm of
what exists in our society at large”93 and emphasized the importance
of affirmative action as an avenue to leadership roles in all major
public and private institutions. Broad access to those roles, said these
representatives of the defense establishment, is needed for public
confidence in our institutions and for the success of those institutions’
missions.
Another brief, filed by General Motors Corporation (GM),
focused a similar argument on the leadership of American business.94
After reaffirming the original rationale for diversity admissions—
improving the quality of education—GM referred to the need for
diversified leadership in GM’s own management, and in the whole
corporate world. “A stratified work force, in which whites dominate
the highest levels of the managerial corps and minorities dominate
the labor corps, may foment racial divisiveness. It would also be
retrogressive, eliminating many of the productivity gains businesses
have made through intensive efforts to eradicate discrimination and
improve relations among workers of different races. . . . [V]aluing

91. Consolidated Brief of Amici Curiae Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al., Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-2411) and Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02516), available at http://www.umich.edu/~urel/admissions/legal/gru_amicus-ussc/um/MilitaryLboth.pdf.
92. General Colin Powell is perhaps the Nation’s best known ROTC graduate.
93. Consolidated Brief of Amici Curiae Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al. at 9, Grutter
(No. 02-2411) and Gratz (No. 02-516).
94. Brief of Amicus Curiae General Motors Corporation, Grutter (No. 02-2411) and Gratz
(No. 02-516).
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diversity has helped [the businesses’] bottom line.”95 Adding to the
force of GM’s argument was a brief amici curiae filed by a consortium
of 65 giant American companies with combined revenues well over a
trillion dollars.96 Yet another brief, filed by the AFL-CIO, stressed
the same point, but from the perspective of workers on the shop floor:
the need for integrated business leadership in order to further the
compelling interest in minimizing employment discrimination based
on race or ethnicity.97
From Weber in 1979 to Grutter in 2003, we find private
individuals and groups placing their weight behind policies aimed
achieving more inclusive institutional norms. If in Weber Kaiser and
the union were supporting a more inclusive corps of craft personnel
because they feared governmental intervention, in Grutter the former
military officials, the big companies, and the union were—entirely
voluntarily —seeking to nudge the Supreme Court toward policies
designed to improve the inclusiveness of leadership cadres in major
American institutions both public and private. The world of business
and labor has taken a turn or two since 1979; one instructive irony is
that the list of 65 companies that joined as amici in Grutter includes
the Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.
It remains to ask, what is it that drives powerful representatives
of the private sector to support what they see as policies designed to
enhance equal citizenship at ground level? What can be done, by
private or public actors, to encourage that sort of private support?
Those two questions are the central concern of my final topic.
Undoubtedly, some companies’ top management today remain
concerned about potential liability under Title VII for employment
discrimination.98 The $175 million settlement paid by Texaco in the
mid-1990s serves as a vivid cautionary tale.99 But avoiding liability is
95. Id. at 24.
96. Brief of Amici Curiae 65 Leading American Businesses, Grutter (No. 02-2411) and
Gratz (No. 02-516).
97. Brief of Amicus Curiae American Federation of Labor & Congress of Industrial
Organizations, Grutter (No. 02-2411) and Gratz (No. 02-516).
98. In 1998 some 21,450 cases, 8.4 percent of all federal civil cases filed, were employment
discrimination cases. Wendy Bliss, The Wheel of Misfortune, HR MAGAZINE, May 2000, at 207,
207.
99. See Shari Caudron, Don’t Make Texaco’s $175 Million Mistake, WORKFORCE, Mar.
1997, at 59, 59 (describing Texaco’s “diversity debacle”). On Texaco’s swift adoption of an
ambitious diversity program, emphasizing hiring and career development, and calling for
systematic feedback to supervisors and accountability of leadership at all levels—what the Rev.
Jesse Jackson called Texaco’s voyage from “tragedy to triumph”—see MARGARET A. HART,
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only part of the reason why, by 1996, some 74 percent of the Fortune
500 companies had instituted diversity initiatives, looking not only to
minority hiring and promotions but also to the job satisfaction of
minority employees and the growing purchasing power of minority
communities.100 An example is BankBoston; the bank’s director of
workforce effectiveness, speaking of the relation of the company’s
ambitious diversity efforts, took note of “a strong link [connecting]
employee satisfaction, customer satisfaction and shareholder
value.”101 About a decade ago the Federal Glass Ceiling Commission
cited a study of factors relating to the hiring and advancement of
women and minorities in the Standard and Poor 500 companies. The
researchers found that the stock performance (annualized return) of
the 100 companies making the strongest efforts toward equal
employment opportunity (EEO) was 2.5 times greater than that of
100 companies that rated lowest in EEO effort.102 The echo we hear is
the language about “the bottom line” in GM’s brief in the Grutter
case.
The argument for the diversification of colleges (private as well
as public) on the ground that it will serve to integrate leadership
groups is a reminder that most of the individuals thus integrated, by
definition, will be leaders. Even the enforcement of laws against
discrimination in employment (private as well as public) will mainly
benefit workers, or would-be workers, who are prepared to take
MANAGING DIVERSITY FOR SUSTAINED COMPETITIVENESS 19–21 (Conference Bd., Report
No. 1195-97-CH, 1997).
100. Caudron, supra note 99, at 60–61. By the estimate of one professional counselor,
however, a great many of these plans are largely nominal; only about 15 percent are what the
counselor calls “qua lity EEO and diversity programs.” Id.
101. Id. at 62.
102. FEDERAL GLASS CEILING COMM’N, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, GOOD FOR BUSINESS:
MAKING FULL USE OF THE N ATION’S HUMAN CAPITAL 14 (1995) [hereinafter GOOD FOR
BUSINESS]. According to the Conference Board, a number of companies, recognizing this link,
have tied executive compensation and bonuses to the achievement of the companies’ diversity
goals. See HART, supra note 99, at 7–8 (noting such ties at DuPont and Phillip Morris). Now, we
are really talking about “interest convergence.” See Derrick A. Bell, Brown v. Board of
Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma , 93 HARV. L. R EV. 518, 522–23 (1980)
(focusing on the search for equality and racial neutrality post -Brown).
For an exploration of factors that managers should consider as they seek to reap the
advantages of a diverse corps of employees, see generally TAYLOR COX, JR., CULTURAL
DIVERSITY IN ORGANIZATIONS: THEORY, R ESEARCH & PRACTICE (1993). For the views of top
corporate leaders on essential practical measures along these lines, see HART, supra note 99, at
6–12 (statements by leaders of DuPont, Quaker Oats, General Motors, Philip Morris, and
General Electric). See also GOOD FOR BUSINESS, supra, at 38–56 (describing characteristics of
successful corporate diversity practices and programs).
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advantage of employment opportunities—prepared, that is, by
schooling or by some other training or experience. Neither of these
forms of civil rights action—not affirmative action, and not
antidiscrimination law—has much immediate value for the minority
poor who are concentrated in our inner cities, the ones William Julius
Wilson called “the truly disadvantaged.”103 Worse still, as Wilson has
shown, the desperation of our poorest neighborhoods has a way of
reproducing itself.104 In other words, the remedies that are the main
stock-in-trade of civil rights lawyers leave wholly untouched the
cruelest and most disgraceful conditions in American society. That
these conditions are to be found in every one of the Nation’s largest
cities is a major part of the disgrace.
Well, you may say, civil rights programs can’t do everything;
what about poverty programs? The only sensible response is this: the
alleviation of poverty in our inner cities lies at the heart of the
guarantee of equal citizenship. This is a civil rights goal of the first
importance—and it deserves a prominent place in the civil rights
canon.
Given today’s climate for constitutional doctrine, it is vain to
suppose that the Supreme Court will soon embrace an affirmative
duty of government to relieve even severe, race-related poverty of the
sort found in our inner cities. So, I do not repeat earlier arguments
along those lines.105 What remains is to take note of a movement in
antipoverty action and scholarship that is closely connected with our
subject: the mobilization of the private sector in support of equal
citizenship at ground level. After some false starts, the community
economic development (CED) movement gathered new strength in
the 1990s, with various forms of financial aid106 sponsored by the
national government. Community-based nonprofit organizations
(CBOs) proliferated, especially in poor areas in large cities. These
nongovernmental organizations107 can be seen as a form of local

103. WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY , THE
UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 115 (1987); see also id. at 15–16, 112–18, 121–24.
104. The structural foundations of this systematic disadvantage are the central subject of
Wilson’s WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS, supra note 69.
105. E.g., Karst, supra note 67, at 31–49; see supra note 69 and accompanying text.
106. Some forms of financial aid included grants, tax credits, and loan gua rantees.
107. In some discussions, particularly by British authors, organizations like these are called
quasi-nongovernmental organizations (“quangos”), because of their close relationships with
government—for example, the British Council. See also Quasi-autonomous non-governmental
organization, WIKIPEDIA , at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quasi-autonomous_non-government_
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economic self-help, in a model first made famous in Booker T.
Washington’s writings and actions.108 The model has found modern
support from the Reagan and Clinton administrations.109 The CBOs
have seen themselves as accountable primarily to local residents.
They promote, and sometimes co-own, local enterprises largely
controlled by nonprofit private groups. The enterprises are aimed at
economic development that shows promise of improving the
residents’ housing, employment, or business opportunities.110
This form of market-based CED movement, as Scott Cummings
notes, has resonated “both with conservative proponents of free
market principles and progressive advocates of localized
empowerment strategies.”111 Accordingly, it has sought to deploy
public resources as leverage to induce private investment aimed at the
goals just noted. The movement’s emphasis on localism has included
not only an ingredient of “local control” (a term that had
considerable vogue a generation ago) but, more importantly, a
commitment to the local community as what a lawyer might call the
real party in interest, or the beneficiary in a trust relationship.112 As
one might expect, achieving these aims is a complex process. It faces
challenges not just in the local communities’ general economic and
political weakness, but also in the exigencies of local politics, and
even in the complications of politics within the enterprises
themselves. Nonetheless, the CED movement has scored some
notable successes. William Simon has carefully and sympathetically
analyzed the expe rience to date; although he recognizes the limits of
the CED movement, he especially applauds the movement’s efforts to
democratize decisions through mechanisms of local community

organisation (last visited Sept. 18, 2005) (providing the U.K. governmental definition of the
term).
108. AUGUST MEIER, N EGRO THOUGHT IN AMERICA, 1880–1915: RACIAL IDEOLOGIES IN
THE AGE OF BOOKER T. WASHINGTON 100–20 (1963).
109. An excellent guide here is Scott L. Cummings, Community Economic Development as
Progressive Politics: Toward a Grassroots Movement for Economic Justice, 54 STAN. L. R EV.
399, 409–21 (2001) (covering the early history of the movement); see also id. at 421–29
(describing developments from 1980 to 2000).
110. Another indispensable source is WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE COMMUNITY ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT MOVEMENT (2000). On this occasion it is fitting to note that Simon’s publisher
is the Duke University Press.
111. Cummings, supra note 109, at 437.
112. Id. at 442–46.
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control.113 The movement has also engendered a forceful criticism
from within; strong adherents to the goals of the movement have
argued that it has been inadequate to its task, failing to increase
significantly the employment of the inner city poor or the provision of
affordable housing—in short, benefiting private investors more than
the local population. Indeed, these critics argue that market-based
CED has ignored the goal of distributive justice and undermined local
political power. The latter effect, the critics say, flows from CED’s
tendencies to depoliticize the process of community improvement and
to deflect local residents from seeking broader structural reforms by
making alliances with others such as labor unions and the white
poor.114
The main concern here is the enlistment of the private sector ’s
resources in the cause of a more inclusive society, and the CBOs that
have dominated the CED movement are (in form) part of the private
sector, although their programs, relying on governmental subsidies or
tax credits for private investors, are public-private hybrids. But
another more recent movement aims to achieve similar purposes by a
mechanism that the term “private sector” more typically brings to
mind. The main premise of this movement is that the profit motive
can be harnessed to the revival of poor urban communities by
inducing private business interests to make use of what Michael
Porter (of the Harvard Business School), in a now-celebrated 1995
article, called the competitive advantage of the inner city.115 Professor
Porter is no romantic; he recognizes the primacy for businesses of
“bottom line” imperatives, just as GM did in supporting affirmative
action programs at the University of Michigan. He argues that the
inner cities have several types of advantage that should appeal to
private investment: “strategic location, local market demand,
integration with [locally variable] regional clusters, and human
resources.”116 He has given much of his recent energies to putting the
theory into practice through studies and projects organized by the
Institute for A Competitive Inner City (ICIC).117 Self-described
113. See SIMON, supra note 110, at 1–5 (introducing the ideas of the CED movement). This
work deserves to be read in full by anyone interested in the revitalization of poor urban
communities. I have not even begun to suggest the richness of Simon’s analysis.
114. See Cummings, supra note 109, at 447–64 (describing the critique).
115. Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of the Inner City, HARV. BUS. R EV.,
May-June 1995, at 55.
116. Id. at 57.
117. The Institute’s web site is http://www.icic.org.
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friendly critics, agreeing generally with Porter’s emphases on clusters,
regional linkages, and job training, fault him for giving insufficient
credit to some governments and some CBOs for their past and
ongoing successes along just these lines.118 As the critics welcome the
current wave of CED founded on for-profit institutions, they also call
for a strong version of public-private collaboration in the
establishment of new inner-city enterprises.119
Porter’s views have evolved since 1995, and he has lauded CBOs
for their contributions to local development, calling on them to
“move to the next stage,” focusing “on private, for-profit
initiatives.”120 CBOs, in his view, do have roles to play in identifying
real estate suitable for development; helping to broker inter-business
connections; facilitating access to banks and other sources of
financing; helping to deflect local resentment of the for-profit
enterprises; and helping to connect local residents to the new innercity jobs created by development.121 He has not seen CBOs as
candidates for significant control over local development, however. In
short, this is market-based CED without the control by local
community groups, and Professor Cummings has recently criticized it
for being no more likely than the predecessor version of CED to
address the political bases of the isolation of the minority poor.122
Like the other friendly critics, Cummings does not reject the Porter
thesis out of hand. He expressly endorses its concerns to promote the
economy of the local community by remedies with a broader regional
reach;123 its emphasis on creating business enterprises in the local

118. See Bennett Harrison & Amy K. Glasmeier, Response, Why Business Alone Won’t
Redevelop the Inner City: A Friendly Critique of Michael Porter’s Approach to Urban
Revitalization, 11 ECON. DEV. Q. 28, 31–32, 33–34 (1997).
119. They also recommend that Porter expand his analysis to take account of recent
scholarship on (i) the possible limiting effects of technological change on the utility of the
“clusters” approach, and (ii) the ways in which firms learn by doing. Id. at 32–33, 35–36. The
spirit of these parts of the critique is, indeed, friendly, and it is predictable that Porter will be
receptive.
120. Michael E. Porter, New Strategies for Inner-City Economic Development, 11 ECON.
DEV. Q. 11, 17 (1997).
121. Id.
122. Scott L. Cummings, Between Markets and Politics: A Response to Porter’s Competitive
Advantage Thesis, 82 OR. L .R EV. 901, 902–04 (2004).
123. Id. For some success stories, see BRUCE J. KATZ, R EVIVING CITIES: THINK
METROPOLITAN (Brookings Inst., Policy Brief #33, 1998), at http://www.brookings.org/
comm/policybriefs/pb33.htm (last visited June 27, 2005). See also Antonio R. Villaraigosa,
America’s Urban Agenda: A View from California, BROOKINGS R EV., Summer 2000, at 46, 46–
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community that are sustainable because they “produce for outside as
well as inside demand”;124 and its targeting of job training aimed at
the projected employment needs of the businesses and industries
established in the community. The latter goal responds to the “skills
mismatch” identified in Wilson’s writings.125 It is the political
dimension of CED that divides Porter and Cummings. Porter sees
government aid as necessary to improve the business environment
(controlling crime, improving public schools, offering worker training,
upgrading roads and other aspects of infrastructure—and, above all,
“streamlining regulation,” thus removing obstacles to investment).126
Cummings would add a different set of concerns about local politics
that, he argues, are essential to do equity in the community. Here he
invokes arguments commonly seen in the literature of housing
discrimination—for example, government’s historic role in creating
and maintaining the geographical isolation of the minority poor.127
Further, Cummings calls for new political forms of regional
coordination: for example, in the distribution of federal financial aid,
and in the location of higher-growth industries that are also the
source of high-wage jobs.128 He says that market-based CED carries
the risk of concentrating low-wage jobs in the inner cities, as local
governments compete to give tax breaks to businesses that produce
high property tax revenues.129 He calls for a “politically engaged
CED” in which neighborhood-based groups have a voice in

49 (suggesting states take an active role in promoting revitalization of metropolitan areas),
available at http://www.brookings.org/press/REVIEW/summer2000/ villaraigosa.htm.
124. Cummings, supra note 122, at 909.
125. See supra notes 103 and 104.
126. Porter, supra note 120, at 17.
127. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
128. On the necessity of regional planning and programming for the institutional reforms
essential to CED’s goals of distributive justice, see Scott L. Cummings, Recentralization:
Community Economic Development and the Case for Regionalism, 8 J. SMALL & EMERGING
BUS. L. 131, 131–48 (2004).
For an elaborate argument for a “new regionalism” that recognizes the necessity for
networks of metropolitan dimension in the economic development of inner cities (and, not
incidentally, for the deployment of suburban resources to that end), see MANUEL PASTOR, JR.,
ET AL., R EGIONS THAT WORK: HOW CITIES AND SUBURBS CAN GROW TOGETHER 4–11
(2000). This study surveys growth patterns in a number of American metropolitan areas, id. at
125–54, offers considerable detail on greater Los Ang eles, id. at 17–78, and spells out a policy
program that has a lot in common with Cummings’s recommendations.
129. The classic example is the “big box” retailer that contributes handsomely to a city’s
property tax revenues because its buildings and parking lots occupy a huge area—and pays most
employees at extremely low levels.
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development strategies,130 and he cites the prominent success of one
such project: the participation of the Figueroa Corridor Coalition for
Economic Justice in the planning of the Staples Center in Los
Angeles.131 He uses this joint effort to illustrate two propositions: first,
that the active participation of CBOs can facilitate rather than hinder
development decisions; and second, that this cooperation can lead to
forms of development that benefit local residents with higher-wage
jobs.132 In sum, Cummings seeks not to undermine the Porter thesis
but to add a political element in the interest of developmental
equity—that is, distributive justice. It is uncertain whether this
argument will be wholly persuasive to Porter and his Institute, but
they have made clear that they value collaboration of for-profit
businesses with CBOs.133 At the very least, it would seem both
economically and politically prudent for the sponsors of a for-profit
enterprise to take the initiative, actively seeking the help of the local
CBO in performing the functions Porter has suggested for them.
Once the CBO is involved, it can raise—in the spirit of cooperation, if
the CBO’s leade rs are themselves prudent—such questions as the
Figueroa Corridor group raised concerning the Staples Center.134
The ambitious program of the ICIC begins in research and is well
on the way to producing an impressive national data base that will aid
inner-city CED programs of all stripes.135 In addition to its research,
ICIC offers advice, encouragement, and (in some cases) its own
investment in development projects in the inner cities. The
momentum of this organization—which has become a movement all
its own—is such that we can expect the funding of a large number of
new market-based CED projects in the near future. Given the current
paucity of public resources, especially in state and local governments,
these ICIC-inspired projects may well be the most significant new
130. Cummings, supra note 122, at 905.
131. Id. at 922–23.
132. The Staples Center is a multi-purpose arena for indoor sports, concerts, and other
entertainment. The Figueroa Corridor Coalition included “community organizations,
neighborhood developers, unions, and environmental groups.” Id. at 923.
133. Professor Porter has lauded community-based organizations (CBO) for their
contributions to local development. He worries, however, that CBOs’ insistence on the hiring of
local residents can drive companies away. Porter, supra note 120, at 21.
134. For some instructive examples of this kind of cooperation, see Angela Glover
Blackwell, Promoting Equitable Development, 34 IND. L. R EV. 1273, 1285–87 (2001).
135. For a taste of these data, see the impressive prospectus for ICIC’s October 2003 forum
in N EW Y ORK CITY, THE STATE OF THE INNER CITY ECONOMIES, at http://www.icic.org/
Documents/soice.ppt (last visited Jan. 9, 2004).
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CED undertakings in sight. It is permissible to hope that these
projects will provide scores of examples of cooperation between the
businesses and the CBOs in the fashion I have suggested.
CONCLUSION
The stories recounted in this Essay are, at the very least, a
reminder of the importance of nongovernmental actors in the fields I
have examined. Direct governmental regulation, including the
provision of civil remedy, typically depends on the initiative of those
who suffer discrimination. In the workplace and in public
accommodations, such laws can be called the civil rights success
stories of our time. In housing, analogous laws have failed. Where the
stick fails, however, the carrot may succeed. As the community
economic development movement suggests, government subsidies
and other forms of cooperation with private actors offer real
prospects for renewals of the spirit as well as the neighborhood. One
way or another, nongovernmental action will continue to play a
crucial role in determining the fate of the principle of equal
citizenship at ground level.

